Freiherr von Jungkenn papers (1775-1784)

Freiherr von Jungkenn papers (1775-1784)

Collection Scope and Content Note

The von Jungkenn papers comprise one of the major resources in North America for study of the "Hessian" auxiliaries to British forces during the American Revolution. The correspondence, diaries, and military returns of German officers hired by the British during the American Revolution provide a thorough documentation of the military activities involving German forces, and insight into the martial culture that bound them to the British authority. As professional soldiers, serving for pay, rather than patriotism, von Jungkenn and his fellow German officers were often more candid in their assessments of the war and less inclined to the self-serving or wishful myopia that hindered some of their British colleagues. The involvement of German auxiliaries in many of the most significant campaigns of the war make the von Jungkenn collection of great importance for understanding both military and social aspects of the Revolution.

Nearly all of the correspondence received by von Jungkenn is written either in German or French, reflecting the linguistic difficulties posed in fielding a multi-national, multi-lingual force. The letters in German are written exclusively in the old script. The correspondence of Adj. Gen. Maj. Bauermeister comprises the most extensive single correspondence in the collection -- almost one third of the von Jungkenn Papers -- and has been fully translated and published by Bernhard Uhlendorf.

Biography

European warfare during the 18th century was an international affair. An international martial culture shaped elite attitudes toward the conduct of war, and equally significantly, foreign mercenaries were employed throughout Europe and the European colonies to supplement the small standing armies at the core of each nation's defence. From an American vantage, the most famous of these mercenaries were those drawn from six independent German states that were attached to British forces during the American Revolution. With the overwhelming majority of these mercenaries coming from Hesse-Cassel, the whole force came to be refered to as Hessian.

Frederick Christian Arnold, freiherr von Jungkenn, was the youngest son of a German family of the lesser nobility. Although his youth was spent near the family home in Colgenstein, the military was his only true home. At an early age, von Jungkenn entered a Prussian infantry regiment commanded by a cousin, and by the age of 21, had been commissioned as ensign. Like many military men of his generation, however, his break came during the Seven Years' War when at age 25 he accepted a 2nd Lieutenant's commission in a regiment commanded by Frederick, the hereditary prince of Hesse-Cassel. In this capacity, von Jungkenn earned some notice for himself in campaigns in Silesia and Bohemia, but it was the personal connection with the future ruler of his principality that paved his path to fame. When Frederick was elevated to Landgrave of Hesse-Cassel in 1760, von Jungkenn followed into his court. Transferring to the 1st Hessian Guards as a captain, he was appointed 3rd Adjutant General under Frederick, and from there, his rise through the ranks was as rapid as it was assured. By 1776 he was colonel, by 1777, major general and Lord High Chamberlain at court, and by 1781, he had attained the rank of lieutenant general. In court, von Jungkenn climbed just as steadily, taking a seat in council in 1779, and succeeding Baron Martin von Schlieffen as Minister of State in 1780, an appointment which included the duties of secretary of war. Von Jungkenn's military and administrative acumen was highly prized by the Landgrave and his successor, so much so that his requests to resign his post were refused three times before they were finally accepted in 1789.

The seeds of von Jungkenn's association with America were planted during the spring and summer, 1775, when armed insurrection began in the colonies. With only about 18,000 men at his disposal, and unable to increase his ground forces sufficiently by recuitment in England, George III sought to hire troops from abroad to quell the rebellion. Rebuffed by Catherine of Russia, George loaned himself five battalions from his Hanoverian army, but few Hanoverians ever reached American service. Instead, offers to supply troops from the Count of Hesse-Hanau (a nephew of the King), the Markgrave of Ansbach-Bayreuth, and the Prince of Waldeck formed the nucleus of a mercenary army.

The first contract for the provision of mercenary troops was struck in January, 1776, when an English veteran of the Seven Years' War, Col. William Faucitt, reached an agreement with Duke Charles I of Brunswick. The Duchy ultimately supplied over 5,700 soldiers to the British cause, of whom only about half ever returned to Germany. In short order, similar treaties were arrived at with Hesse-Cassel -- long allies of the English -- Waldeck, Ansbach-Bayreuth, Anhalt-Zerbst, and Hesse-Hanau, each desperate for the infusion of money that mercenary activity afforded. The Waldeck troops served mainly in the Floridas, the Hesse-Hanauers largely in Canada, while the others served variously in the colonies. Von Jungkenn's principality of Hesse-Hanau supplied the greatest number of soldiers, almost 17,000 out of the total mercenary force of 30,000. In another measure of the commitment of the principality to the counter-Revolutionary cause, approximately one of every four able-bodied adult men in the principality saw American service. Among the rulers of other German states -- those that did not contract in mercenaries -- the princes who supplied mercenaries were viewed as traffickers in blood, though the practice was common and widely accepted. In America, the troops were viewed with loathing and disdain, symbolizing the tyranny of the monarchy and the barbarity of British rule.

By agreement, the German mercenaries were required to swear allegiance to the British crown, though without having to renounce their allegiance to their own rulers, and although they had their own commanders, they were under the overall command of British forces. The first contingent of Germans arrived at Halifax in June, 1776, soon numbering almost 22,000, a figure which remained nearly constant throughout the war. By special agreement, the Hesse-Cassel troops were commanded by their own generals -- successively Leopold Philipp von Heister, Wilhelm von Knyphausen, and Baron Friedrich Wilhelm von Lossberg. The officers of all of the German regiments regularly reported to Jungkenn as one of the highest-placed officers in the command.

In all, fifteen Hessian regiments were authorized by the Landgrave, including infantry, grenadier, dragoon, jäger, and artillery regiments. During their service in America, they and other German mercenaries took part in nearly every major land engagement, fighting with varying degrees of efficiency and prominence, particularly during the southern campaigns of 1780-1781. Their reputation for rapacity, pillaging, marauding, and plundering may well have been deserved, but Hessian behavior was probably little different than that of other European soldiers -- or that of many American soldiers in dealing with their Loyalist foes.

After von Jungkenn was allowed to resign as minister in 1789, he retired to Schloss Hüffe, Kreis Minden, Westphalia, remaining there until his death on November 11, 1809.

A Hessian Map from the American Revolution: Its Origin and Purpose

A Hessian Map from the American Revolution: Its Origin and Purpose

Peter J. Guthorn’s “A Hessian Map from the American Revolution: Its Origin and Purpose” (1976) examines a military map associated with the forces of the Electorate of Hesse operating in North America during the American Revolutionary War. The article focuses on identifying the map’s provenance, reconstructing the circumstances of its production, and clarifying its intended operational function within Hessian and British military planning.

Guthorn situates the map within the Hessian expeditionary presence in British service, where German auxiliary units participated in campaigns across multiple theaters of the war. He argues that the map was produced for tactical and operational use rather than general geographic reference, emphasizing features such as routes of movement, terrain constraints, settlements, and positions of strategic value relevant to field command.

The study traces the cartographic practice to Hessian military surveying traditions, showing how such materials were integrated into broader British command structures. It also considers the map as part of a transatlantic exchange of military intelligence and technical knowledge, in which allied forces shared and adapted cartographic resources for campaign planning in unfamiliar terrain.

Attention is given to the technical characteristics of the map, including its scale, symbology, and representation of terrain, which reflect 18th-century European military cartographic conventions. These features are analyzed in comparison with other contemporary military maps to situate the document within established surveying and drafting practices of the period.

Guthorn’s analysis treats the map as both an artifact of Hessian military participation and a working instrument of campaign logistics, highlighting the role of German auxiliary forces not only in combat but also in the technical and administrative infrastructure of British operations in North America.

The Making of Patriots: Love of Fatherland and Negotiating Monarchy in Seventeenth‐Century Germany

The Making of Patriots: Love of Fatherland and Negotiating Monarchy in Seventeenth‐Century Germany

Robert von Friedeburg’s “The Making of Patriots: Love of Fatherland and Negotiating Monarchy in Seventeenth-Century Germany” (2005) examines the development of early modern political loyalty in the German lands of the Holy Roman Empire, focusing on how ideas of “fatherland” (Vaterland) emerged in relation to princely authority and monarchical governance.

The article argues that seventeenth-century “patriotism” should not be understood in the modern nationalist sense, but rather as a negotiated form of loyalty that operated within layered political structures. Subjects could express attachment to their territory, estate, or imperial order while still affirming loyalty to their sovereign prince. Friedeburg traces how these overlapping identities were articulated in political discourse, legal arguments, sermons, and administrative writing.

A central theme is the interaction between estates (regional elites and representative bodies) and territorial rulers. The article shows how political actors used the language of “fatherland” to negotiate obligations such as taxation, military service, and legal authority. Rather than a simple top-down imposition of loyalty, Friedeburg emphasizes a process of bargaining in which subjects and rulers mutually defined expectations within the constraints of monarchical governance.

The study also places these developments within the broader context of post-Reformation political culture, where confessional identity, imperial law, and territorial sovereignty intersected. It highlights how concepts of belonging were shaped by both intellectual traditions and practical governance, especially in times of war and fiscal pressure.

Friedeburg’s analysis contributes to the reinterpretation of early modern political identity by showing that forms of “patriotism” existed well before modern nationalism, but operated through different conceptual frameworks rooted in estate society and dynastic rule.

The Decision to Hire German Troops in the War of American Independence: Reactions in Britain and North America, 1774–1776.

The Decision to Hire German Troops in the War of American Independence: Reactions in Britain and North America, 1774–1776.

Friederike Baer’s “The Decision to Hire German Troops in the War of American Independence: Reactions in Britain and North America, 1774–1776” (2015) examines the political decision-making process behind Britain’s use of German auxiliary forces—especially from the Electorate of Hesse—at the outbreak of the American Revolutionary War, and how that decision was received on both sides of the Atlantic.

The article traces how British ministers, facing a shortage of domestic troops and the growing scale of rebellion in North America, turned to established subsidy networks with German principalities. Baer emphasizes that this was not an improvised measure but part of a long-standing European practice of hiring allied contingents, particularly from Hesse-Kassel, which had a well-developed system of professionalized, exportable military forces.

A major focus of the study is the political debate within Britain surrounding the use of German troops. Baer shows that while the decision was justified on pragmatic military grounds, it also generated criticism in Parliament and public discourse, where opponents questioned both the cost and the political wisdom of relying on foreign auxiliaries to suppress colonial rebellion.

The article then examines reactions in North America, where the arrival of German troops was quickly incorporated into revolutionary propaganda. American political writers framed the “Hessians” as mercenaries hired to enforce imperial tyranny, a portrayal that became influential in shaping popular perceptions of German auxiliaries throughout the war. Baer contrasts this image with the administrative reality of the troops as contractual state soldiers bound by formal treaties between Britain and German rulers.

Finally, the study situates the decision within broader eighteenth-century military systems, showing how Britain’s reliance on German troops reflected structural limitations in its standing army and the functioning of transnational military labor markets in Europe. It highlights the intersection of diplomacy, finance, and military logistics in the formation of coalition warfare.

Baer’s analysis ultimately reframes the hiring of German troops as both a practical solution to wartime constraints and a politically contested choice that shaped perceptions of legitimacy, loyalty, and foreign intervention during the early stages of the American Revolution.

Foreign Orders & Decorations: The Electorate of Hesse Cassel

Foreign Orders & Decorations - The Electorate of Hesse Cassel

“Foreign Orders & Decorations – The Electorate of Hesse-Cassel” (pp. 177–183) is a short reference section focused on the system of honors connected to the military and court culture of the Electorate of Hesse. It examines how foreign and dynastic orders were awarded to Hessian officers and officials, and how these decorations functioned within the broader European system of aristocratic and military recognition.

The text typically outlines the role of Hesse-Kassel as both a recipient and distributor of honors within diplomatic and military networks. As a mid-sized German state with a highly professionalized officer corps, Hesse-Kassel maintained close ties with other European courts through the exchange of orders, decorations, and honorary distinctions. These awards were not purely symbolic; they reinforced alliances, acknowledged military service, and reflected rank and status within the officer hierarchy.

A key focus is the interaction between Hessian officers and foreign award systems, particularly those of major powers such as Britain, Austria, and Prussia. Officers who served abroad—especially during subsidy deployments in campaigns like the American Revolutionary War—were often eligible for foreign honors in recognition of their service. These decorations helped integrate Hessian military elites into a broader European aristocratic-military culture.

The section also highlights the importance of orders and decorations as instruments of statecraft. In the fragmented political environment of the German states, honors served as a means of maintaining loyalty, rewarding merit, and reinforcing dynastic legitimacy. They functioned alongside military rank structures, shaping career advancement and social prestige within the officer corps.

Although brief, the discussion provides a concentrated overview of how phaleristic systems operated in Hesse-Kassel, linking military service, court politics, and international recognition into a unified framework of status and obligation within early modern and Napoleonic-era Europe.

Red Bank: Defence of Fort Mercer

Red Bank: Defence of Fort Mercer

This is a commemorative historical paper presented in 1900 that recounts the engagement at Fort Mercer (Red Bank, New Jersey) during the American Revolutionary War, focusing on the October 22, 1777 assault by Hessian forces.

The paper describes the defense of Fort Mercer by approximately 400 Continental troops under Colonel Christopher Greene against an attacking force of roughly 2,000 Hessians commanded by Count Carl von Donop. It frames the engagement as a highly unequal confrontation in which the American defenders successfully repelled a larger, professionally trained German auxiliary force serving in British pay.

A central emphasis is placed on the tactical circumstances of the battle. The Hessian assault is presented as a coordinated frontal attack against prepared defensive works along the Delaware River line, while the American position benefited from fortifications, terrain advantage, and supporting artillery. The account highlights the intensity of the fighting and the eventual withdrawal of the attacking force after sustaining significant losses, including the mortal wounding of Count von Donop.

The paper also reflects the interpretive style common to early 20th-century American local history writing, in which Revolutionary War engagements are often framed as episodes of patriotic resistance. The Hessian troops are portrayed through the lens of their role as British auxiliaries, consistent with American usage of the term during and after the war, while the defenders are emphasized as citizen-soldiers.

Beyond the narrative of the battle itself, the presentation situates the event within the broader context of the Philadelphia campaign of 1777, when British and allied forces attempted to secure control of the Delaware River and supply routes to occupied Philadelphia. The failed assault on Fort Mercer is treated as part of a larger pattern of contested river operations involving both British regulars and German auxiliary units from Hesse-Kassel.

The result is a localized but detailed account of one of the better-known engagements involving Hessian forces in North America, combining military description with commemorative interpretation rooted in regional historical memory.

The Operations of the Allied Army, Under the Command of His Serene Highness Prince Ferdinand, Duke of Brunswick and Luneberg, During the Greatest Part of Six Campaigns, Beginning in the Year 1757, and Ending in the Year 1762.

The Operations of the Allied Army, Under the Command of His Serene Highness Prince Ferdinand, Duke of Brunswick and Luneberg, During the Greatest Part of Six Campaigns, Beginning in the Year 1757, and Ending in the Year 1762.

This work is a contemporary campaign history of the Seven Years’ War (1756–1763), focusing on the operations of the Allied field army in western Germany under Prince Ferdinand of Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel, commander of forces serving Britain, Hanover, and various German allies against France.

Published in London in 1764 by T. Jefferys, the book presents a detailed operational narrative of six campaigning seasons (1757–1762). It describes the maneuver warfare conducted in the German theater, where the Allied army—composed of British, Hanoverian, Hessian, Brunswick, and other contingents—faced repeated French offensives and counteroffensives across the Rhineland and Westphalia. Prince Ferdinand’s command is treated as the central organizing element of these campaigns, particularly after he assumed leadership of Allied forces following early setbacks in 1757.

A major focus of the work is the coordination of multinational forces within the Allied coalition. Units from the Electorate of Hesse feature prominently as part of Britain’s subsidy-based system of German auxiliaries, alongside Hanoverian troops and other contingents from the Holy Roman Empire. The text emphasizes the logistical and strategic challenges of maintaining cohesion among these diverse forces in a fluid operational environment dominated by movement, supply constraints, and seasonal campaigning.

The narrative covers key phases of the war in western Germany, including defensive operations after early French advances, Allied counteroffensives, and campaigns that pushed French forces back across the Rhine at various stages. Battles and maneuvers are described in terms of troop movements, orders of battle, and strategic outcomes rather than personal memoir, reflecting the formal style of 18th-century military historiography.

As a London-printed publication closely associated with official cartographic and military interests (Jefferys was Geographer to the King), the work also reflects British strategic perspective on the continental war effort. It serves both as a campaign history and as a justification of Allied operations, emphasizing the effectiveness of coordinated Anglo-German command under Prince Ferdinand.

The result is a structured operational account of one of the most complex coalition theaters of the Seven Years’ War, documenting how British-funded German auxiliaries, including Hessian forces, were integrated into a larger European war effort against France.