Tuesday, October 16, 2018

Der Feldzug der K. Preußischen Armee am Rhein im Jahre 1793 by August Wagner


“Der Feldzug der K. Preußischen Armee am Rhein im Jahre 1793” by August Wagner (1831) is a military-historical narrative of the Prussian army’s operations on the Rhine during the 1793 phase of the First Coalition campaigns against Revolutionary France.

The work focuses on the re-engagement of Prussian forces after the setbacks of 1792, describing their return to active operations along the Rhine frontier in coordination with other coalition partners. It traces troop movements, command decisions, and engagements associated with attempts to stabilize and regain initiative against French Revolutionary forces operating in the region.

A significant portion of the account addresses coalition structure and the integration of German contingents within Prussian-led operations. Units from the Electorate of Hesse appear within this framework as part of the broader allied military system, contributing to screening operations, garrison duties, and support roles in Rhine campaigns.

The narrative emphasizes operational challenges such as supply constraints, terrain difficulties along the Rhine corridor, and coordination issues among multinational forces. It also describes the shifting strategic situation in 1793, as coalition armies attempted to regain momentum following earlier reverses and reorganize defensive and offensive positions.

Written in the early 19th century, the work reflects a period of German military historiography focused on detailed campaign reconstruction. It combines chronological narration with analysis of operational effectiveness, particularly regarding the performance of Prussian command structures during extended frontier warfare.

“Geschichte der Kriege in Europa seit dem Jahre 1792 als Folgen der Staatsveränderung in Frankreich unter Ludwig XVI” by Friedrich Wilhelm von Schütz


“Geschichte der Kriege in Europa seit dem Jahre 1792 als Folgen der Staatsveränderung in Frankreich unter Ludwig XVI” by Friedrich Wilhelm von Schütz (1827) is a multi-volume historical study of the European wars that began in 1792 as a consequence of the political transformation of France during the revolutionary crisis at the end of the reign of Louis XVI.

The work traces the outbreak and expansion of the French Revolutionary Wars, beginning with the collapse of the French monarchy and the emergence of Revolutionary France, and following the resulting military conflicts across Europe. It covers the formation of coalition armies, early invasions of French territory, and the shifting balance of power as the wars expanded into a continent-wide struggle.

A major focus is the First Coalition campaigns of 1792–1794, including operations along the Rhine, in the Low Countries, and on the northeastern frontier of France. The narrative examines military organization, diplomatic coordination, and the operational difficulties faced by allied armies composed of Prussian, Austrian, and various German contingents.

Within this framework, troops from states such as the Electorate of Hesse are discussed as part of the broader German contribution to coalition warfare. Their participation is presented in relation to field operations, garrison service, and support roles within multinational armies operating under shifting command structures.

The author emphasizes the connection between internal French political transformation and the external military response it provoked, framing the Revolutionary Wars as a direct consequence of systemic political change in France under Louis XVI. Military campaigns are analyzed alongside diplomatic developments and the restructuring of European alliances.

Schütz’s work reflects early 19th-century historiography, combining narrative military history with political interpretation. It aims to explain the Revolutionary Wars as a unified historical process, linking state transformation in France to the broader reconfiguration of European warfare and international relations after 1792.

Sunday, October 14, 2018

The Grenadier Battalion of Linsingen in the Assault on Fort Redbank 1777


Since the Americans had fallen into the hands of the English and Hessians on September 26, 1777, but still with their oars under the protection of Fort Redbank barred shipping on the Delaware, the Hessian Colonel received from Donop the English General Lord Cornwalli's order to go over the Delaware with a detachment of Hessian Jäger, the Grenadier battalions of Linsingen, Minningerode and Lengerke, and the regiment of Mirbach, together with eight battalions and two English howitzers at Copersfery, on the left bank of this River below Philadelphia take away Fort Redbank with a storm. *)

*) The Grenadier Battalion of Linsingen was the Grenadier Compagnies of the 2nd Guards (later 2nd Battalion Guardsman) and 3rd Guards of the Leib-Regiment (subsequently 1st battalion of the 1st Infantry Regiment) and the Regiment of Mirbach (later Fusiliers Battalion ). The Grenadier Battalion of Minningerode was formed by the Grenadier Companies of the Regiments of the Erbprinz (included in the subsequent Fusilier Battalion), Löhberg (2nd Battalion of the Life Guards Regiment), Knyphausen (2nd Battalion of the 2nd Infantry Regiment), and Ditfurth (reduced in 1795) , Lengerke's Grenadier Battalion consisted of the Grenadier Companies of the Regiments of Wuttginau (2nd Battalion of the 1st Infantry Regiment), Prince Carl (reduced 1832), Donop (1st Battalion of the 1st Infantry Regiment) and Trummbach (1st Battalion) of the 3rd Infantry Regiment). - The Regiment of Mirbach was Fusilier Battalion and received in 1856 the designation: Schützen Battalion.

It was thought that the fortifications of this fort were so insignificant at the English headquarters, according to confiscated inquiries, that Lord Cornwallis, at the request of Colonel Donop, whether the charge should be carried out under all circumstances, and at his request for an even more difficult one cannon, to whom he gave the disparaging answer: that if he and his Hessian would find the task set too difficult, he should only say so by putting it to execution by English troops.

Unfortunately, it was forgotten that those inquiries on which this confidence was based had already been absorbed nearly three weeks ago, and since then the Americans had had enough time to remedy those shortcomings.

The fort, consisting of a regular pentagon and one side close to the Delaware, not only had a high and strong mound with the existing deep and wide ditch and covered path, but was also on the four sides of the land facing 30 steps away from the foot of the glacis girded with a dense abatis and wolf pits behind it. Likewise, in the ditch itself, as well as at the entrance to the front, several networks favoring the defense were built, and a detached redoubt had been built on the summit of a sand-hill close to the Delaware, and dominating the north-front.

All of these works were staffed by a number of heavy guns equivalent to their size, as well as 2 battalions of Virginian and 2 battalions of New England militia under Colonel Hasselworth.

As the fort was surrounded by the primeval forest which at that time still covered the area, approaching almost 400 steps, especially by the northern front, Colonel Donop was able to approach the fort unnoticed, not only at noon on the 21st of October but also to pick up some crew sent to receive cattle for slaughter, from whose testimony it was stated that the crew was in complete lightheartedness and that nothing less was prepared for a near attack.

Although, according to this, there was every prospect of being able to seize the fort by means of a rapid attack, Colonel von Donop, whether it was prescribed by his order of conduct, or led to it by hope, allowed his purpose to be achieved without bloodshed being able to formally ask the American Commander to be surrendered by a parliamentarian. Using this misunderstanding cleverly for his past, the latter was able to consult the resulting negotiations until the afternoon of 4 o'clock, in order to gain time to put himself in defensive position. To be sure, this time was also very useful for the Hessian side, to reconnoiter the fort, to determine the most appropriate point of attack, and to make a considerable quantity of tearing bundles to fill the trenches; yet this did not keep the balance with the advantages which this offered to the enemy.

According to the orders made by Colonel Donop, especially since there had been no evidence of the proximity of the enemy oars, the north face, facing upwards, was to be attacked so vigorously by artillery, then by the Grenadier battalion of Minnesota. The regiment of Mirbach and the grenadier battalion of Linsingen attacked the fort itself, and the grenadier battalion of Lengerke remained in reserve. To each of the storming battalions all the carpenters of the same, as well as 100 man-bearers, were to be led by a henchman, the former to open passages in the present case, the latter to make trench transitions by means of the tufts.

At four o'clock in the afternoon, at last, when the American Commandant had given a definite refusal to surrender, Colonel von Donop summoned all the staff officers, informed them of the manner in which each of them was to proceed, and added a short one and urgent request: remembering that at the prevailing opinion in England's headquarters about the nature of the fort, the conquest of which had become a necessity for the Hessian military doctrine, venturing even the utmost.

After this, each commander had set foot on the foot of his unit, and the signal for the opening of this gunfire was made. But as the day soon began to run out, after a quarter of an hour of rather ineffectual bombardment the further signal was given at the beginning of the assault.

The battalions who attacked him undoubtedly belonged to the bravest, most beautiful troops of the time. Like every captain of his company, every staff officer to his battalion, so did Colonel von Donop, a handsome officer still in his prime, well-respected for his fine sense of honor, knightly demeanor and fiery courage, the bravest of the brave with the sword in hand.

In rapid succession the interlocking was reached, and in spite of the murderous grape-shot and small-gunfire, which was soon to be directed by the works of the fort on the onslaughters, it penetrated into them.

So great was the eagerness of the storming to open passageways through this interception, that even severely wounded did not pay attention to their wounds and even wounded several times did not give way. In particular, Captain von Stamford of the Grenadier Battalion of Linsingen, though he had been hit almost at the same time by a bullet in the left leg and another in the left shoulder, distinguished himself in the most glorious, and endeavored to bravely put his hand to When he broke the lock, and when he had succeeded, he, the first one, rushed to the main wall, although his sword was smashed out of his hand by a pestle and his right shoulder was struck.

Hessians attack the southern wall.

But as the very first, through the intercourse, wound themselves, they found beyond it, as far as the foot of the glacis, not only a multiple series of wolf-pits, between which was to pass only one by one, but became, as they emigrated, the same Suddenly also from two American rowing galleys close to the Delaware shore, which had hitherto not been perceived because of the dense bank growth, most surprisingly with grape-shot and chain-balls in the shot at the right flank. Nevertheless, even this could not stop them; rather, the regiment of Mirbach and the Grenadier Battalion of Linsingen, so to speak before the mouths of the enemy guns, rejoined the glacis of the covered path anew, if only fleetingly limb, though the flank fire from those rudder-galleys heaped the crew in heaps, and then, in the midst of the triumphant victory of the Grenadier Battalion of Minningerode, which had just penetrated the detached redoubt, pressed on, on towards the moat and main wall.

Already, the first of the stormers began to climb this and try to penetrate into the loopholes or burst open the entrance gate, as from the ditch-caponier also a violent gunfire broke loose in her left flank.

Then it is an unfortunate coincidence that almost at the same time not only Colonel von Donop but all the staff officers and captains sink mortally or seriously wounded to the ground.

COUNT DONOP, 1777.
Count Carl Emilius von Donop mortally wounded at the Battle of Red Bank.

Nevertheless, the team still does not let go of storms; but, since almost all the other officers are killed or wounded, the line is missing.

The individual who had climbed up the ramparts and entered the loopholes did not follow the necessary support; they were pushed back with lances and bayonets. The whole thing faltered, until the ever-increasing twilight makes the continuation of the fight in these circumstances impossible anyway, and thus gives reason for the attackers to retreat.

Fortunately, the Americans did not dare to make a loss, so that even the majority of the severely wounded, after the complete collapse of darkness, still had occasion to crawl back to the near edge of the forest, and thus very few of them enemy captivity.

Nevertheless, the total loss of the stormers amounted to 26 officers and 376 civilians.

Besides the commander of the regiment of Mirbach-Colonel von Schick-8 other officers were dead. Amongst those who were seriously injured in hostile captivity Gerathenen was the Captain Wagner and Lieutenant Heimel and Colonel von Donop himself.

A shotgun bullet had shattered his right leg in the hip just as he was about to climb the wall.
At the same time those who had stood round him were partly killed, some were badly wounded. So he had fallen between the bundles of shreds piled up here and gone unnoticed.

Only at dawn he was found by the Americans, and at once with all care he made his way to the fort and summoned up everything to give him the most sought-after care.

However, since an amputation of the leg was impossible, he had to give up the ghost already on the 29th of October, after suffering enduring only forty-five years. But even in death the enemy honored him by solemnly burying him with all his military honors on the north front of the fort, where he had preceded his followers by storm. He was also there, after the Americans had voluntarily evicted Fort Redbank shortly thereafter, a memorial stone with the inscription: Multis Flebilis Occidit d. h. to German - he died mourned by many - erected.

But the debris of the battalions, more than decimated by the storm, had taken their departure again during the night, under the command of the Lieutenant Colonel Linsingen, on the same way in which they had come, and were pursuing-without any trace at all will be returning to Philadelphia at noon on the 23rd of October.

Although, as a result of the great departure still continuing in the course of the American War, only a few of the men of the two Guards Regiments, who had come to America, returned to their homes, there were some when the war against France broke out in 1792, though after that, almost 30 years had elapsed since they had ceased to be enemies, but equaled their ancestors, and decorated their flags with new, no less brilliant laurels than those on the battlefields at the Speyerbache, Hochstadt, Bergen, and Prussian Minden had achieved.


(Translated from pages 39-44.)
Das kurhessische Leibgarde-Regiment: Eine geschichtl. Skizze
Maximilian von Ditfurth, 1882



Friday, October 12, 2018

“Geschichte des Krieges in Hannover, Hessen und Westfalen von 1757 bis 1763. Nach bisher unbenutzten handschriftlichen Originalien und anderen Quellen politisch-militärisch” by Karl Friedrich von Renouard

“Geschichte des Krieges in Hannover, Hessen und Westfalen von 1757 bis 1763. Nach bisher unbenutzten handschriftlichen Originalien und anderen Quellen politisch-militärisch” by Karl Friedrich von Renouard is a 19th-century military-historical study of the Seven Years’ War in the German northwest, based on archival manuscripts and other primary source materials.

The work focuses on operations in Hanover, Hesse, and Westphalia during the period 1757–1763, situating regional campaigns within the broader context of the Seven Years' War. It reconstructs troop movements, battles, occupations, and strategic maneuvers involving French, Hanoverian, Prussian, and allied forces operating across northern Germany.

A significant portion of the analysis is devoted to coalition warfare within the Holy Roman Empire, particularly the coordination of German territorial contingents alongside larger European armies. Forces from the Electorate of Hesse are treated as part of this broader system of allied operations, contributing troops and participating in campaign actions under shifting command structures.

The narrative emphasizes the operational complexity of the Hanoverian theater, including French incursions, allied counteroffensives, and the fluctuating control of strategic positions across Westphalia and the Lower Rhine region. Attention is given to logistics, supply lines, and the challenges of sustaining coordinated multinational operations over extended campaigns.

Renouard’s work is based on previously unused archival documents, giving it a strong source-critical foundation. It reflects 19th-century German military historiography, combining detailed campaign reconstruction with an emphasis on political and operational context.




Hessen-Kassel. Leib-Dragoner-Regiment. Husaren-Regiment. 1789


Hessen-Kassel: Dragoner vom Leib-Dragoner-Regiment 1789 / 
Husar und Husarenoffizier vom Husaren-Regiment 1789
(Uniformenkunde, Bd.II, Nr. 20), Richard Knötel



Sunday, October 7, 2018

“Abhandlung über den kleinen Krieg / Treatise On Partisan Warfare” by Johann von Ewald

“Abhandlung über den kleinen Krieg” by Johann von Ewald is a military-theoretical treatise on irregular warfare, based on the author’s extensive experience as an officer in light infantry and ranger-type units during 18th-century European and transatlantic conflicts.

Ewald develops a systematic analysis of what was then called “kleiner Krieg” (small war), meaning operations conducted outside conventional linear battles—such as reconnaissance, skirmishing, raids, ambushes, outpost duty, and the harassment of enemy supply lines. The work emphasizes mobility, terrain usage, initiative at the small-unit level, and the psychological effects of irregular pressure on conventional armies.

A significant portion of the conceptual background derives from Ewald’s service in German auxiliary forces, particularly those associated with the Electorate of Hesse, which deployed troops in both European and overseas theaters. His operational experience includes service in North America during the American Revolutionary War, where light troops played an important role in reconnaissance and frontier warfare conditions.

The treatise contrasts “small war” with linear battlefield tactics, arguing that light troops require different training, discipline, and command flexibility than line infantry. Ewald stresses independent decision-making by junior officers and non-commissioned officers, as well as the importance of adapting tactics to terrain and enemy behavior.

Written in a didactic military style, the work functions both as a theoretical framework and a practical manual for officers commanding light troops. It reflects late 18th-century efforts to formalize irregular warfare as a distinct branch of military science, bridging experience from European campaigns and colonial warfare in North America.

Ewald’s treatise later became influential in military thought, particularly in discussions of light infantry doctrine and the development of modern concepts of reconnaissance and small-unit tactics.

Tuesday, October 2, 2018

"Das Kurhessische Leibgarde-Regiment: Eine geschichtliche Skizze" by Maximilian von Ditfurth


Das Kurhessische Leibgarde-Regiment: Eine geschichtliche Skizze by Maximilian von Ditfurth (1882, Kassel) is a short 19th-century regimental history focused on one of the elite formations of the Electorate of Hesse’s military establishment. It belongs to the tradition of German officer-authored regimental histories that were written to preserve institutional memory and honor military heritage rather than to provide modern academic analysis.

The book traces the origins and development of the Kurhessian Leibgarde Regiment, beginning with earlier guard formations in the 17th and 18th centuries and following their evolution into a formalized elite regiment. Ditfurth outlines the organizational structure of the unit, its traditions, and its role within the broader Kurhessian army system. The narrative is largely chronological and centers on continuity, discipline, and institutional identity.

A significant portion of the work discusses the regiment’s participation in major military conflicts and campaigns of the period, including the broader context of European warfare in which Hesse-Kassel troops frequently served as auxiliaries. Rather than deep tactical analysis, the emphasis is placed on service records, notable actions, and the reputation of the regiment’s officers and soldiers.

Stylistically, the book reflects its era. It is descriptive, concise, and written in a formal military tone that often emphasizes honor, loyalty, and tradition. Like many regimental histories of the 1800s, it carries a patriotic and institutional perspective, prioritizing the prestige of the unit over critical interpretation or broader political context.



Erstes Regiment Garde