Bruchstücke zur Kriegsgeschichte 1793

Neues Militairisches Magazin 

Historischen und Scientifischen Inhalts Band 2, 1801

(New Militair Magazine Historical and Scientific Content)

I. Fragments to the War History 1793.
Continuation of Vol 1. St. VII

At the end of the last section I passed the Prussian army, and the Hesse-Cassel corps united with it in the winter cantonments on the two banks of the Main, and the right of the Rhine; Cassel (or Castel) was encircled by the capture of Plochheim and the position of the Hohenlohischen Corps, and the mountain fortress Königstein still resisted the ramparts of the victors. The enemy army cantoned between the Rhine and near Speyer via Worms, Oppenheim and Mainz to Bingen and Kreuzenach, and at times interspersed the Hundsrück between the Nahe and the Rhine, as far as the area of Rheinfels; he had received considerable gains during the winter.

This mild winter from 1792 to 1793 rarely covered the Rhine with ice, and thus prevented larger  engagements. The months of January, February, and the first half of the Merz, therefore, generally proceeded quietly, excepting some skirmishes and preparations for the forthcoming active campaign. The latter has shown success, and I want to touch the former only in the Vorbeygehn.

In the first days of February, the Köhler Hussar rider von Schmidt received the news that the enemy had advanced in the area of Simmern; he therefore sent Lieutenant von Weiss with 40 horses and 20 Jägern from Rheinfels against Rheinballen to investigate. At the height beyond Bacherach, this detachment encountered a strong enemy troupe, and pursued it as far as the village of Rheinballen; but as this was found to be heavily occupied by cavalry and infantry, Lieutenant von Weiss was forced to retreat by the enemy with 3 men were cut down and 4 captured; the Prussians lose the one (bleſsirten)? and one prisoner.

During the night from the 6th to the 7th of February, Captain von Heydebrecht of the regiment Count Herzberg, a piquet of the occupation of Königstein by one officer and 20 men, who held the latter in the town below. The officer and 9 men were caught, 11 killed. The Prussians had a wounded captain and one soldier killed

On the 12th of February, the Frenchmen of Moslem (see the 1st section) made an attempt to land at Ginsheim in the Darmstadt; At the end they occupied the Nonnenaue with infantry and artillery, and drove the Hessian Piquet of Hussars and Jäger, which is on the shore. But the chief scribe hastened into the neighborhood with the Hussar regiment and the battalion of fusiliers, and on the following day the colonel von Rüchel.  With the help of a battery, the enemy was immediately expelled from the meadow with the removal of an ammunition cart, and his maneuver was thwarted.

From the 20th to the 26th of February the king and duke reconnoitered the bank of the Rhine to Rheinfels, and on the 30th and 31st the colonel v. Szeculi, a Prussian partisan, with a light corps the Rhine at St. Goar. This corps consisted of the Féselier battalion of Wedel, 1 Compagnie Trierscher Jäger, 2 canons, and a detachment of light cavalry, drawn from all the Dragoons and Hussar regiments; Colonel Szeculi advanced with this corps against the Nahe, and occupied the castle and position at the Stromberg, partly to disturb the enemy, but chiefly to form a firm point on the left bank of the Rhine, which might facilitate the passage of the army.

The 8th Merz was finally passed by Königstein with 14 canons; the crew of 14 officers and 421 civilians were transported to Frankfurt as prisoners of war in the afternoon.

The campaign, which lasted until late in the winter, the consequences of the ruinous course after the Campaign, and the delay in the supply of all necessities for the coming campaign, delayed by the great distance of the Prussian States, did not suggest an early opening of it, especially as one

could not take a step without finding a very heavy stumbling-block at Mainz.  Although it was Prussian side immediately after taking Frankfurt had endeavored - to demand fresh and several troops to supplement and strengthen the army, which also arrived in February and Merz; of the same, 6000 Saxons joined the army as a Reichs contingent; this magnificant Corps passed the 16th, 17th and 18th Merz through Frankfurt and cantoned on the right bank of the Main; Würzburg, other German princes, and the Prussian states in Franconia also received some guns and ammunition; but this alone was not enough for a company on Mainz, to whose reservation the necessities only arrived much later from Holland and the Prussian hereditary lands.  On the other hand, the army itself still lacked many horses and requisites for the opening of the Campaign; Thus, the Hessian Corps, which was to consist of 6,000 men, had received neither supplementary crew nor field staff and campers when the 19th Merz command was given that the army should start moving on the 22nd.

The motives for this swift decision were the following: in the conference held with the Prince of Coburg at Frankfurt on February 6th about the operations of the upcoming Campaign, it was decided, among others, that the Kayserliche army on the lower Rhine for the time being only to relieve Mastricht, to cleanse the right bank of the Meuse, and to maintain until the Prussian army would have taken Mainz, after the passage of which they would first proceed to the reconquest of the Netherlands.  But this Kayserliche army, which during the winter by a great mistake of the enemy general, about which he justified himself, asserted itself on the bank of the Roer, and during which was considerably strengthened, to which still a Prussian Corps under the Duke of Brunswick Oels pushed, and advances from Wesel against Venlo and Rüremond made the extraordinary preliminary steps.  The prince v. Coburg did not join this army at Cölln until about the 10th of February, and in the last days of February the victor, fled behind the Scheldt in a leap from the Roer. These quick progressions of an army, which neither wanted to give in to activity, nor after the appointment, also persuaded the king to advance across the Rhine and the temporary encirclement of Mainz, at least showing his goodwill, though the siege itself was still a physical impossibility. Without dispute, it would have been Austrian interest to be accelerated conquest of this fortress more than it did, since its possession is so highly necessary for asserting the Netherlands, and for covering the extensive operations and communication with its army there; but how much should not have happened in this war, which did not happen.  After this, for the sake of an overview of the whole, I must turn again to the Prussian army, which has been ordered to advance, and the Hessian Corps at Frankfurt, which is united with it.  The same was, as has already been said, the siege of Mainz. At the end, you had to cross the Rhine and drive the General Custine's enemy army so far that they did not hinder that enterprise.  After much deliberation, the army ought to pass the Rhine at Bacherach, leaving a corps behind Cassel, the enemy from his position at Kreuzenach, and at one with the one between Manheim and Speyer.

The Rhine passed through the Imperial army of Count Wurmser, until they drove out over Landau; set up an observation army behind the Queich and Bliess, and send back a corps to Mainz's blockade; the former under separate orders of the Duke of Brunswick, the latter under the General Count of Kalkreuth; the corps in front of Cassel came under the command of General Lieutenant v. Schoenfeld.  The Hessian Corps had the following composition here; the avant-garde or the Hussar regiment, the jager and light infantry battalion, under the Colonel Schreiber, was to join the Prince Hohenlohe Corps, and with it to the Observation Army; 5 Escadrons and 5 battalions, however, were assigned to the corps of General Lieutenant von Schonfeld, and with this to the blockade of Cassel. The Lieutenant-General von Biesenrodt, it is true, made it impossible for the Corps to march on the 22nd of Merz, for his field-reinforcements had not yet arrived, although their dispatch had been ordered. But as this filled a gap in the general disposition, it was permitted: to canton before the hand, but the march remained fixed.

The Hessian light troops therefore united on the 21st of March at the bridge of Rüsselsheim, joined the Hohenlohe Corps and cantoned in Bärstädt. Likewise, the infantry regimes broke today Prince Heinrich, 2 battalions of Romberg, Kleist regiment, and 1 battalion of Mannstein, then the Dragoon Regiments of Lottum and Katte, the Duke of Weimar Couriers Regiment, and the Bat Decker and Puttkammer and made a right turn against Badstrasse or Langenschwalbach.

The Hohenzollern Corps and the Hessian light troops left and moved to the rear, the latter to Langscheit and area. Likewise the headquarters and the guards of Frankfurt marched this morning went through Sachsenhaussen, out to the monkey gate and cantoned in Keltersbach etc. The regiments Tadden, Wolframsdorf and Ferdinand moved also in the area of Wisbaden.

On the 23rd, the Hohenlohische Corps continued its march against Bacherach; the Hessian light troops cantoned in Ramsel; the army followed the same regiments, and the headquarters, together with the guards, moved from Kellersbach to Russelsheim and the region. Just as a regiment marched in advance on the heights between Erbenheim and the Häuserhof in the face of Mainz, it swung in, made a bonfire of Coburg's victory over the sea-winds, and continued his march on.

The Hohenlohische Corps had the 24th rest day and the army moved closer together; the guards and headquarters marched for Wisbäden; but on the 25th the Hessian light troops left at 4 o'clock in the morning, and went via Kaub to Bacherach, where they crossed the Rhine with the Hohenlohische Corps on the pontoon bridges and moved over Rhine bays to Reierscheid, the army followed, but the guards remained on the 29th under the command of the crown prince, as a reserve in Wisbaden, whereupon they also passed the Rhine and moved to Nie.

The choice of the crossing of the Rhine at Bacherach places in a field, like the Duke of Braun silent, sufficient reasons to presume that they are best, even if their real motives are not yet known; besides, one would think it would have been far more advantageous to pass the Rhine in the area of Oppenheim, and thus to break through the enemy army, to negotiate the position on the Nahe, and to block the main road to Elsas. At least Custine has no such valid advocate in himself, if he is rightly reproached for not having put obstacles in the way of the passage of the Prussians and the Imperialists, for which his shorter line offered him sufficient means, for he had here through the Curvature of the Rhine only the tendon, but the Prussians describe the bow; so it was certainly a big mistake that he did not use the Szeculian Corps with more power, and it cost what he wished to throw across the Rhine when he undertook it on the 16th and 20th; the position on the Nahe was only to be decided entirely when the Prussians had actually passed the Rhine against all their efforts; But Custine could and had to know this transition, and if he was properly prepared, then he would rush with a corps against Bacherach, like the Prussian army at Cassel but he could still arrive early enough, and certainly not delay the crossing, but certainly delay it; There was something to be dared for at the time-alone-there was determination in it, and that his generosity was not in Custine's character proves his occupation in the fall of 1792, before the capture of Mainz.

On the 26th Colonel Schreiber advanced with the Hessian light troops, as the avant-garde of the Hohenlohe Corps to Schöneberg, without anything of the enemy: but the 27th broke out of their quarters at four o'clock; Hohenlohische Corps assembled at Dachsweer, where the Szeculian Corps also joined him. Hereupon when the whole procession marched into trains on the right, forming it threw it as far as Bingen over the Nahe, and thereupon occupied a camp at the village of Weiler. The enemy had over 30 dead in this incident; 5 cannons were captured and 273 prisoners were made, including General Lieutenant Neuwgerger with 13 officers. The Hessian jagers, led by the commendable Major von Motz captured 2 cannons.

At 2 o'clock in the morning, Bingen was shot at, then abandoned by the enemy.  At 8 o'clock in the morning the Hessian Corps had to occupy Rommelsheim, but at 6 o'clock the same thing happened near Bingen and moved to Engelstadt. After the capture of Bingen, the enemy had the 29th its advantageous positions in Kreuzenach and Alzei abandoned so eagerly that one could not catch him and on the retreat only a few prisoners were made. The duke took his headquarters today on the 29th in Armsheim, and the Hessian avant-garde advanced to Ufhofen.

The troops broke out of their quarters early at 5 o'clock, and marched left into columns after they had gathered at Arnsheim.  The march crossed Dorndeckheim on Alsheim on the old Rhine, where the avant-garde captured 80 enemy cavalrymen, and penetrated into the plain against Oppenheim and Worms. The enemy was thereupon expelled from Guntersblum, Gemsheim, Eiche, Hamm, and Ivers heimerhof, and occupied Worms; In addition to many deaths, today six cannons and 1,200 prisoners are lost.

The loss on this side was unimportant; the Hessian Hussars had at the skirmish of Guntersblum 7 horses killed, 1 Unterofficier, 14 Hussars and 8 horses  wounded.  At about six o'clock, just as gracious as brave Prince Louis of Prussia, with three escadrons of Anspach Baireuth, an enemy corps on the retreat at Worms, into which he immediately invaded, conquered 500 launches and 6 cannons and 1,200 prisoners. The headquarters was taken in Guntersblum.

On April 1, the Duke of Brunswick wrote from Guntersblum to the Major von Hirschfeld in Hochheim:

"Everything is quite desirable, the enemy is running so fast that it is hardly possible to acquire laurels from him, meanwhile the main end goal will be reached over all expectation quickly, and very happy, without significant loss of our side now clean from the French, and they have long left the Rhine, all their entrenchments beyond Speyer, so that last night Wurmser (from the 30th to the 1st) between Manheim and Speyer is set across the Rhine without any obstacles. "

Colonel Szeculi rescued considerable magazines in Worms and Frankenthal, and six hundred of the men of Mainz, together with several baggage, club-bakers, etc., who wanted to break through Oppenheim to Landau, were thrown back to Mainz.

So the enemy army was expelled behind Landau; the part of the Prussian and Hessian troops destined for the observation army followed her into the above-mentioned positions, and the other, who was to undertake the blockade herself; Through the positions at Niederingelheim, via Stadeck to Oppenheim, the crew cut off all communications with France, and prepared for the following narrow confinement of Mainz.

Source: 
Neues Militairisches Magazin  Historischen und Scientifischen Inhalts Band 2, 1801; pp. 1-10

Keyword: Schreiber

“Das Hessische Korps in Amerika 1776–1783 (Transcript)” by C. L. Bauermeister

Das Hessische Korps in Amerika 1776 - 1783 (Transcript)

“Das Hessische Korps in Amerika 1776–1783 (Transcript)” by C. L. Bauermeister is a documentary transcription of a German-language military account describing the service of Hessian troops in North America during the American Revolutionary War.

The work focuses on the operations of the Hessian corps sent from the Electorate of Hesse to serve under British command in the American colonies. It provides a structured account of troop organization, deployments, and campaigns over the duration of the war from 1776 to 1783.

A central emphasis is placed on the composition and movement of Hessian regiments across different theaters, including service in New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and the southern colonies. The transcript details marching routes, garrison assignments, battlefield engagements, and the logistical framework that sustained long-term overseas operations.

The material also reflects on the administrative structure of the corps, including command hierarchy, recruitment systems, discipline, and coordination with British military leadership. It highlights the integration of Hessian forces into a broader coalition army while maintaining their distinct regimental identity.

In addition to operational details, the transcript includes observations on soldier experience, such as campaigning conditions, supply challenges, and interactions with local populations. These elements provide insight into the lived realities of German auxiliary troops serving in North America.

As a transcript-based publication, the work functions primarily as a preserved historical source rather than a narrative synthesis. It is intended to make German archival material accessible for research into the participation of Hessian forces in the American Revolutionary War, preserving details of their military organization and operational history.

Exerzier-Reglement für die Infanterie der Kurhessischen Armee (Cassel, 1814)

Exerzier-Reglement für die Infanterie der Kurhessischen Armee  

Cassel, 1814

Exerzier-Reglement für die Infanterie der Kurhessischen Armee (Cassel, 1814) is an official military drill manual issued for the infantry of the post-Napoleonic Hessian forces of the Electorate/landgraviate of Hesse-Kassel (Kurhessen). Although published after the end of the main campaigns of the American Revolutionary War, it reflects the longer institutional evolution of Hessian military practice shaped in part by earlier 18th-century experience, including overseas service.

The manual sets out standardized procedures for infantry training, battlefield maneuver, and unit discipline. It covers the formation of companies and battalions, marching orders, firing drills, skirmishing procedures, and the execution of battlefield evolutions under command. The emphasis is on uniformity, precision, and obedience—key elements of early 19th-century European “drill culture.”

It was produced for the army of the Electorate of Hesse (often referred to in the Napoleonic and post-Napoleonic period as Kurhessen), which had a long-standing tradition of professionalized infantry service and international military contracting. While the document itself reflects reforms of the Napoleonic era, the institutional background includes earlier practices such as the 18th-century recruitment system that supplied troops for British service in North America.

The reglement also illustrates the broader transition from 18th-century linear warfare toward more standardized, centralized military doctrine in German states following the upheavals of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic periods. It reflects a shift toward codified training systems intended to ensure battlefield cohesion across expanding conscript and standing armies.

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Flügelhorn Signale

“Der Feldzug der Verbündeten in Frankreich im Jahre 1792: Aus authentischen Quellen”

Der Feldzug der Verbündeten in Frankreich im Jahre 1792

“Der Feldzug der Verbündeten in Frankreich im Jahre 1792: Aus authentischen Quellen” is a documentary military history based on contemporary reports describing the opening phase of the wars of the French Revolutionary era, specifically the 1792 campaign of the First Coalition against Revolutionary France. It falls within the broader context of the revolutionary and early Napoleonic conflicts that followed, but it is distinct from the American Revolutionary War in time and theater.

The work focuses on the invasion of France by allied European forces composed primarily of Austrian, Prussian, and various German contingent troops operating under coalition command. It reconstructs operational movements, strategic planning, and battlefield actions during the initial campaign phase in northeastern France, particularly along the frontier regions.

A central theme is the coordination problems faced by coalition armies drawn from multiple German states and imperial contingents, including forces from entities such as the Electorate of Hesse. Although Hessian troops are more historically associated with earlier British subsidy service in North America, German military systems broadly share organizational and doctrinal continuities that the work implicitly reflects in its discussion of coalition operations.

The text draws on “authentic sources,” meaning official dispatches, military correspondence, and contemporary reports from officers involved in the campaign. It emphasizes troop movements, supply constraints, command coordination challenges, and the rapid deterioration of coalition momentum during the early stages of the invasion.

Key events typically associated with this campaign include the advance toward Paris, logistical breakdowns, and the eventual withdrawal following setbacks such as disease, supply shortages, and the growing effectiveness of French revolutionary forces. The narrative frames these developments as part of a broader transformation in European warfare brought on by the French Revolution.

As a documentary compilation, the work is structured around primary-source excerpts rather than continuous narrative interpretation. Its purpose is to provide an evidence-based account of coalition operations in 1792, highlighting the difficulties of multinational military coordination in the early revolutionary wars.

Zeitschrift für Kunst, Wissenschaft, und Geschichte des Krieges. I. Memories from Loßberg. (Continuation.)

Zeitschrift für Kunst, Wissenschaft, und Geschichte des Krieges.

(Issues from 1828-1861)

Journal of Art, Science and History of War

Translated Extract pp. 95-125
Keyword: Schreiber

Zeitschrift für Kunst, Wissenschaft und Geschichte des Krieges
Band 66.1846

I. Memories from Loßberg. (Continuation.)

The withdrawal of Mainz gave the war a completely different form, by forcing the allied army, retreated from France, to take the offensive again at once, in order to throw the enemy back on the left bank of the Rhine, since then we first besieged Mainz, which, in the most optimal case, was no longer feasible in the current year.

But before I share, as we came at last, and what a glorious portion the Hessians, especially the Guards Grenadier Regiment, took part in the events, a few more words about how it was possible for such a significant fortress as Mainz to do so could quickly fall into enemy hands, how little Custine has used this unexpected stroke of luck, and why we moved so heavily to become masters of the right bank of the Rhine, with the exception of Cassel - the bridgehead of Mainz.

The fact that the Prussians, having only the conquest of Paris before them, penetrated as far as St. Menehould and Clermont without adequate flank cover in Brabant and on the Upper Rhine, also meant that a French army arrived in Mainz without significant resistance find, action could. To be sure, under Prince Esterhazy, 12,000 to 15,000 Austrians in the Breisgau region and about 4,000 emigrants on the right, as well as 7,000 Austrians under General Erbach, stood between the Saar and the Mosel. However, there were only 3,000 men under the matric Colonel Winkelmann in the city of Speier, exhibited in neutral territory to cover the same magazine. But this neutrality was not disputed by the French General Custine, who was at Landau with 18,000 men.  Informed by the weakness of the Winkelmann corps, the latter advanced, with the approval of the French Directory, to Winkelmann for retreat to the Rhine, and compelled this corps on the left bank, opposite the village of Rheinhausen, to surrender: not within a year to serve France.  After completing the weapon, Custine returned to the mere rumor that a Streichish corps was advancing against him, back to Landau. Winkelmann had mercilessly recourse to Speier, which brought about both his corps' perception of his prison and the loss of the magazine by bringing one and the other to Mainz, which gave the garrison 3000 more soldiers, he as the leader of this troop A strong word in the measures of defense to be taken would have been able to have a say, and would have found its bravura in the right sphere. As an excuse, Winkelmann found that he had brought together ships on the Rhine, which, however, sailed off the cannon-shot that had fallen on the first bet, with no guard at hand. Probably Winkelmann had also assumed that Custine would respect neutrality, and one must now be amazed at the partiality that a war of leading parties could lay a magazine on neutral ground and assume that the opponent would respect such neutrality.

It was not until 16 October that Custine set off from Landau, after several inhabitants of the Rhine area (chiefly from Mainz, where Jakobiner clubs had already secretly formed themselves) had come to him, assuring him that it was only his appearance "in order to seize this fortress. Success taught that he had not been deceived. The 19th met Custine before Mainz, the 20th he made some cannon shots against the outworks of the fortress, the 21st were opened the negotiations and the 22nd handed him the decrepit Mainzische Governor Gyming the place against free departure of the 3000 -strong garrison ; a crew that would not have had enough to withstand a regular attack, but was quite sufficient to protect the fort from the first attempt, especially since Custine was no more than 8,000 strong because of detachments to Kreuznach. In the council of war which had been held before the surrender, the engineer-major Eickemeyer, who had the full confidence of the governor but was at the head of all the Jacobin clubs in Mainz, declared: that the fortress cannot last twenty-four hours; only exposed you to a bombardment and a storm without being able to prevent the conquest. A part of the garrison, under their brave Captain Adujar - they were scattered from the corps to Spiers, as were recruits and convalescents-shut themselves out from this surrender by leaving the city with a sounding game, and went to Frankfurt pulled back. If only he had had the strength to violently resist the shameful "handing over of the fortress". The remainder of the garrison consisted of Kreistruppen.

But why, after Custine had carried out his business against Speier, did not the Austrian corps under Esterhazy from the Bretsgau, or that of General Erbach, who stood between the Mosel and the Saar, come running to save Mainz, and why not? The succession of the neighboring German princes, even without an invitation to do so, which nevertheless most assuredly covered their own country, could also assume that they would soon be able to obtain the troops used for this purpose through the offensive movement of the army returning from France now incomprehensible; but the nonspecific substance, which is only able to reason to some extent into the then frail German Reich and its military constitution, and which is not my purpose in detail, will soon come back from his astonishment, but also too lightly to the conviction The result is that both the constitution of the Wehrmacht and the lack of a sense of community have brought about the humiliation of this nation, which only after a long disgrace and oppression has come to consciousness of its strength and now stands stronger than ever before.

May the image of that unhappy time of the powerlessness, selfishness, and fragmentation of the powers caused by the German Empire always hover over all princes, so that they never forget, where the poor defenses and the former disunity of the princes led this country with its powerful inhabitants. The only prince who at that time might have decided to reinforce the garrison of Mainz was Landgrave Wilhelm IX. But he was at that time with his army corps in the position at Clermont.

Custine soon showed that, as a general, he did not deserve the good fortune of having in his hands the fortress of Mainz, which was so important to Germany, in such a light manner, the importance of which was so greatly increased that he had only depended on him From this point on, he would throw himself on the line of retreat of the Prussian army returning from France, by finding no greater difficulty in the removal of Koblenz and Ehrenbreitstein, to which he had even been requested by a deputation of the Koblenz magistrate, than that of Mainz would have, as soon as he would have acted quickly. By this means, that army would have been forced to cross the Rhine near Cologne, which would probably have had the further consequence, in the methodical conduct of the war, that the French were partly in possession of the right bank of the Rhine and Main during the Winters had remained from 1792 to 1793.

Considering that the surrender of Mainz had already been signed on the 21st of October, Custine was sure of the surrender of the fortress on that day, and that on the same day there was a detachment of his army corps near Bingen How, at last, that the first Hessian infantry arrived in Koblenz late at night on October 26, there is no doubt that Custine, if he was supported by a real general, would have acted with determination, and so for the whole war important point earlier than we could. Before Koblenz and Ehrenbreitstein there were only a few Kristristrupers (Triers), among them a few artillerymen who were engaged in the manufacture of cartridges, to which we, during our stay, had to use the fourth part of our service.

The fear that Custine Koblenz would give in to punish the city for accepting the emigrants before the opening of the campaign had led the Magistrate to ask him to take care of them, while at the same time offering himself a respectable one to pay the contribution, which may serve as a proof of what has already been said and how it was then in Germany. Mainly contributed to this by the many spiritual states, whose subjects could have no love for their princes, and still fewer for the general German fatherland, by princes chosen for their lifetime, with few exceptions, only to their own enrichment, as to their next relatives thought, while the latter sought to profit as much as possible from the circumstance that one of their family wore early the archiepiscopal hat sovereign prince.

Custine, on the other hand, was wasting his time in seizing Frankfurt, seizing the salt-works of Nauheim (where, in valiant opposition, he commanded a Hessian command of 2 officers and 90 men, commanded by Captain Wondorf *) of Regiment v. Lossberg, captive), as everywhere in the neighborhood, as far as Weilburg and Limburg, to squander contributions. How much he feared serious resistance, which was probably a main reason why he did not approach the returning allied army, is also clear from the fact that he dared not attack Hanau, an insignificantly fortified city, in which only two Hessian, 1,100 men strong, infantry battalions under the governor General Lieutenant v. Kospoth lay in garrison, which the command of his prince (who at this time, returned from France. Once again in Cassel) it was necessary to see by courage and perseverance what he lacked in the means of defense.

*) Mondorf was too good, too late in the decision to retire; he was circumvented by the enemy cavalry and then surrounded by 1800 men under the command of the enemy's colonel Houchard, where upon he, after he had burned all his cartridges and had a loss of more dead and wounded, captured prisoner of war. Custine, out of boastful vanity, led these prisoners through all, even the narrowest, streets of Frankfurt.

To him who is involved in the methodical warfare of that time, it cannot seem conspicuous that, after the arrival of the Prussian army at Koblenz, we needed six weeks to get Frankfurt back in possession. If, at present, an army were in a similar situation, it would, as much as possible, after a necessary eight-day rest, proceed from Koblenz via Wiesbaden to Hochhetm, by doing good or by force, or by way of Requisition against subsequent payment would take what they needed for their maintenance. But at that time one did not think so, and I am firmly convinced that no one in all the different headquarters had conceived such a thought; for in the Champagne, therefore, a correction was made to such an extent that one had proceeded to see a wrongful military grudge, but that, though the two cases had nothing in common, would have been an outrageous Zdee, to which one was all the louder dared come when the army returning from Champagne seemed too fatigued, and no preparations had been made to supply the troops. The offensive movement was finally decided and advanced there according to all the rules of the art of war. At the end, the army was behind the Lahn, the Operations Base (in Limburg and Weilburg the Duke, as well as one with the Hesse united Prussian Army Corps under Kalkreuth and Biesenrodt in the position known from the Seven Years War bet Krusdorf), whereupon we then slowly advanced in several columns, namely the wing columns on the two catheters, which at Frankfurt (bis there finding less resistance, as could easily be foreseen) in the apex of the triangle. Frankfurt was defended by the French for the reason that the duke's army advancing right wing column over Limburg and Homburg did not leave the garrison's line of retreat to the highest rc. threatened, otherwise this would probably earlier, especially. but on this side movement from Hanau to Sachsenhausen, have left the city. No shot would have fallen at Frankfurt, when the Prussian army marched over Nastadt and Wiesbaden; And Custine, who boasted only where there was no serious resistance, would not have dared to fight a battle against Wiesbaden's army, which could only have been desired on the Prussian side, for all the army detachments advanced by Custine under Neuwinger and Houchard would go to Hochheim be gone.

The opinion that the army returned from Champagne had come too much down to carry out such a movement, and that it lacked the necessary moral strength, I cannot hope for.

An eight-day period in the good quarters of Koblenz, to which the Prussian short marches of Luxemburg contributed, had completely restored us, and also lacked the army in the total strength equal to a third of the team - which again anyway part the crisis by Hesse - But the means were perfectly sufficient for our poorly organized and undisciplined opponents, who themselves had fewer combatants than ourselves, and who at the time did not resemble the picture, which Rotteck, Posse lt u. like. Designed party men to beat wherever we met them. This would have been the case all the more, for in the course of the first campaigns, as in the case of 1794, in the allied army, but especially in our country, the belief was that we would never do otherwise than only through the Greatest superiority of the enemy, could lose a foot of terrain: what belief - I refer to what I said earlier about this in the Guards Grenadier Regiment - has never been shaken in the course of all campaigns; but, in order not to cause any misunderstandings, I do not want to go unnoticed that the former French armies did not resemble those of the last period of the Revolutionary War, much less Napoleon's legions.

To see the accident as it did in Champagne, as well as the difficulty of eating according to the reason of that time, had made the mind so stupid that such an idea could not come up, or at least not come to the proper clarity. This seems all the more incomprehensible, as the French armies in Champagne had not followed the Prussians, but the Greater General Clerfayt over Arlon to conquer Brabant (a favorite idea of Dumouriez); furthermore, Prince Hohenlohe stood by Trier with 15,000 troops, and Custine had already manifested such an inability (especially by his twofold approach to Speier) that afterwards he was subject to much more difficult conditions, the individuality of his adversary, and his poorly disciplined army taking into account the advance over Wiesbaden without the least danger would have been able to step.

Now, as far as the opinion of those concerned is concerned, that by a direct movement of Luxembourg on the left bank of the Rhine towards Mainz the same purpose was most rapidly achieved, I can not therefore share it (although I later reject it) insightful Militair), because the Prussian army returning to Luxembourg was really in such a state of exhaustion that it was then unable to carry out such a movement; It required some rest, but it was preserved by the short marches of Luxembourg and by the eight-day rest at Koblenz, so that the army, which was no longer on the march, could not be compared with that of Luxembourg. Nor would this movement have led to a quicker outcome, even in the happiest case, because this army still had the Rhine crossing, and under much more difficult conditions than at Koblenz, between St. Goar and Mainz, and not Oppenheim by the advanced season no longer allowing a siege of Mainz; Nor could the army, without the possession of this fortress, be preserved on the left bank of the Rhine during the winter; In addition to that, minor casualties to which the army was subjected during the march over the Hundsrück could produce large quantities of Nachkhcile, and finally even the unfortunate battle of Mons delivered on November 5, whereby the Austrians lost the Netherlands to the Maas as the position of Kellermann against the Prince of Hohenlohe, standing near Trier, should have made the march of the Prussian army on the left bank of the Rhine seem very daring.

After this digression I go back to my narrative narrative, which, as I repeat, is based on my diary in these campaigns.

In the first days of November the Prussian Corps under Kalckreuth reached Koblenz, followed by the army of the Duke of Brunswick; The Hessians made way. Gen. Lieut. v. After a command received from his sovereign Biesenrodt set in motion on 4 November to cross the Lahn at Weilburg and so over pouring to reach Marburg, where William IX troops had led to the defense of his country. On the 4th of November, however, the avant-garde in front of us, under Colonel Scribe, met Colonel Houchard, with 1,800 Frenchmen and 4 guns, whom Custine had sent to ravage Weilburg, which prompted Biesenrodt, the Avant-Guard. which was already on the left bank, to take back to the right bank, and to change the direction of the march so that the Army Corps marched through the Westerwald via Herborn in very bad and especially narrow artillery paths whereby he got the Lahn River between fich and the enemy.

At 10 we reached the place of our destiny. Biesenrodt first took his headquarters in Ebsdorf, then on the 13th in Niederwalgern and finally the 19th in Marburg. The Guards Regiment had been here since the thirteenth. The Guards Grenadiers cantoned in the villages of Ober- and Nieder- Weilbach and the surrounding area. The Avant Guard was preposted to the Hessen-Darmstadt borders, and contacted the Hessen-Darmstadt troops stationed at Giessen, so that in the event of an attack the whole thing was in the Seven Years' War known position at Krusdorf, after a designed order of battle, would have united. In this case, a vast disposition was made, according to which the corps should unite. Also had been set up in all quarterly booths fanale and signals (cannon shots) intended to disengage the troops.

Briden had come unexpectedly to meet Colonel Schreiber and Houchard at Weilburg. The latter had the advantage that he marched in concentration, and thus was able to act quickly and faithfully and to attack.

He required only 3 Eskadron's strong Hussars to retreat to the 2-company Jager Corps, which followed the Hussars in fifteen minutes, whereupon Hussars and Jagers united to retreat, with the exception of the Grenadier Battalion Philippsthal, Burger had arrived, and picked up these corps on a hedge located in front of the city for the purpose of pardoning them. After Schreiber guessed that he was dealing with an enemy twice superior to him, he sent the hussars and jagers back through the city and across the Lahn bridge, and followed them with the Grenadier battalion; a detachment of jagerss under Kapilain Ochs and Lieutenant von Muenchhausen made the extreme Arriere Guard. Also Houchard retired, without going into the city (which spared him the arson), back over Weilmünster, which Schreiber determined to refill him by then some hussars. Both parts had some dead and wounded, and the Hussars were taught not to permit individual farmhands to advance with hand horses to reach the quarters earlier, some of them at the head of our Avant-Guard being the Frenchman which also caused the distress that the enemy was informed of the advance of this body.

Colonel Schreiber, in this engagement, proved his reputation as an excellent leader of light troops, and, in his remarks to the commanders, commemorated the same thing very highly advantageous to Captain Ochs. Both were commended in the order of the day*).

*) Colonel Schreiber died as a Hessian general and commander of the Invalides battalion at Karlshafen in 1805; He was one of the most distinguished officers of the Hessian army. Fortune had not favored him to reach a higher position, as he was determined by nature. He sows an equally rare insight into the terrain as he knew how to act on it with determination. In the course of the campaigns from 1792 to 1794 several thousands of Austrians and Prussians were under his command, whom the army commanders had entrusted to him, with the overriding of their own generals and colonels, without first asking whether he was the senior in rank.

Captain Ochs, who died in 1823 as Kurhessian General-Major, raised to nobility in 1802, was already known in the American War as an excellent officer of light troops. The then commander of the Hessian Hunters Corps, Colonel v. Wurmb, whose adjutant was the same in the last days of this war, and Captain Ewald in this corps (who had died as General Lieutenant in the Royal Danish Service), who recognized his usefulness, owed his military training, next. He was Divisional General in Westphalian Services.

v. Munchhausen became the friend of Seume in America, in which both stood in the Jäger Corps; he too was a poet. In the campaign of 1793 he distinguished himself in the Binnenwalde, also in the removal of the Weissenburger lines, and conquered several cannons. Munchhausen commanded in 1806 as Major the Hessian Jäger Battalion and took no Westphalian services. He died in the county of Schaumburg on his estate.

Chenhausen strengthened, formed in position at Krusdorf in the following order. The same was 8000 strong.

At the time of the unification of the Hessian Army Corps with 3 Hessian-Darmstadt battalions in position at Krusdorf, the Prussian army under the Duke of Brunswick had completed the crossing of the Rhine, and thus placed itself behind the right bank of the Lahn, that its left wing (the corps under Kaltkreuth) through the Westerwald via Herborn in contact with us.

In this position, all of us saw the order to advance collectively against the Taunus Passage and towards Frankfurt, in order to attract Custine, where he would set us free, with true longing and bellicose enthusiasm, which feeling was not diminished by the unfortunate engagement of the Prussian General v. Bittinghof had on November 5 at Limburg.

From this the doctrine, which Schreiber received a few days earlier at Wetlburg, had not been heeded enough. With the Grenadier battalions v. Kunitz and v. Mounted in the city, he had not defied his outposts, which Houchard used to hit him with 6,000 men and 10 guns so fast that those grenadier battalions, though not invaded, were quite surprised. barely had the time to reach their designated Allarmplätze. The battle which arose immediately here was, in the great hostile superiority, and as the battalions in these districts took a very splintered company line without reserves, decided very quickly to the disadvantage of the Prussians, to which more contributed that the cannons of the Grenadier battalions on the Right bank Lahn shore were sent back because Bittinghof worried that he would lose them on leaving the city and at the Bridge Passage.

To lose a cannon at that time was considered by the Allied to be such a "significant" honor, that the commanders themselves did not dare to set them up at the most suitable points for the defense of a terrain and for the preservation of their own people, as soon as they had to procure them; to have to stand at the retreat.

The French, on the other hand, act on opposite principles, and the truth is undoubtedly in the middle. The Prussian artillery, however, came to nothing in this battle, because Limburg was in the defile, and because the terrain did not allow the left bank of the Lahn, especially at the point where the battle took place until the return of the Prussians, to be bombarded, The splintered companies were well assaulted by the enemy artillery, and forced to retreat by the greatest embarrassment, losing most of their lives in the city and at the passage of the Lahn Bridge.

Bittinghof took position on the right bank of the Lahn, where Kalckreuth sent him several battalions for reinforcements, and again took possession of the city after Houchard had strangled it and retired to the Taunus Mountains.

Finally, the Prussians and Hessians were ordered to repair them. The former were to cross the Taunusgebirge in the direction of Kintgstein and Homburg in two columns, with small secondary divisions on the left bank of the Rhine crossing the way via St. Goar, and on the right crossing the Nastätten and Wiesbaden. The Zdee was defeated by this movement, and the duke's army everywhere attacked and defeated the enemy in the Taunus mountains; Kalckreuth and Biesenrodt, on the other hand, were not only to cover the left flank of the preceding army, but to bypass even the Taunus mountains, especially the position at Oberursel, in which position one hoped to find the enemy, on the right wing. It was hoped that Custine would withdraw to Hoechheim, and that Frankfurt would thrash out without a sword strike. Biesenrodt merged with Giessen with the 6000-strong General Kalckreuth, who took command of both corps here.

The Hesse-Darmstädter still saw the order to collectively advance.  The advance was, after the line-up behind the Lahn, and since one had been intimidated by the unfortunate campaign in the Champagne, calculated militarily correctly, especially because here also the food of the troops, which themselves still on the left bank of the river Lahn Brod and Fourage from Koblenz received, not lost sight of. But because the Prussian side did not carry out this movement with enough consequence, the intended result was achieved only partially.

The duke's army already hit the 26th side of the Taunus Mountains in the village of Esch. On the 28th the big Homburg headquarters arrived, and finally the enemy was found on the 29th of Oberursel, where he had thrown up some of the hills. Houchard stood here with four thousand men, taking Custine, his headquarters in Höchst, with his army of no more than 24,000 men, in the shape of a triangle in defense of the present terrain, so that Frankfurt, Oberursel, and Castel near Mainz formed the angular points of it.

After a reconnaissance of the enemy's position at Oberursel and an insignificant battle resulting from it, the duke rode back to Homburg and spent another three days (until December 2) with it to become master of the terrain which the enemy on this day of self-evacuated.

Massenbach claims that the duke is against the advance to the Main rc. because he had not promised himself a good deal of success, and when he had to give in, he had executed it with exaggerated caution and the greatest slowness. But why the duke, after Kalckrruth had united with him, did not advance with all his might against Hochst, for which he would have been strong enough with his army detachment, Beth appears to a field commander, who in the Seven Years' War so often in the opposite error , in which too much audacity had fallen, incomprehensible.

The advance to Höchst would have caused Custine to evacuate Frankfurt immediately. At that time the Duke must have had no knowledge of the strength of the enemy, nor had he made a comparison of his troops with those of the enemy. The latter would have had to choose him, with the greatest determination to hit him, because this would have led him to a quick victory. At that time the whole army, which at that time, in view of their training and the spirit of the troops, consisted of the best soldiers, whereas the French, still in the organization, and down from the officer to the soldier-especially the national troops-wished without the were at least knowledgeable*).

*) In the lists of the French army under Custine, from which no secret was made, "and which one found everywhere, were called a lot of regiments and corps, but this alone lacked half of the complete strength.

If the united army so advanced and pursued its advantage, Custine would have run as far as Mainz, even at that moment perhaps the time had come to make Brander through a troop detachment proceeding from the very top on the left bank of the Main after the Matnphe in order to ruin the Mainz ship bridge, as well as to take Castel and the Biebericher Aue, of which the Duke's headquarters were often mentioned later. That Custine did not expect this movement would have favored them all the more.

True, the duke joined Homburg with Kalckreuth, who with his 6,000 Prussians, leaving the Hessian corps, contacted him here, crossing the Nidda near Vilbel; but he remained with his army at Oberursel, and even gave December 1 a complete rest day by making his movement dependent on Frankfurt success. According to this, the commander of Frankfurt, the French general van Helden, if he had understood his mire better, could inflict a much greater loss on the storm columns advancing against the city on 2 December than, as will be seen below, in the Reality was the case.

Biesenrobt sat down with 8,000 men on the 25th of November, on the same day that the Duke crossed the Lahn-Limburg, also from Marburg and surrounding area, joined the 26th at Steinbrrg, an hour behind casting, with 6,000 Prussians and Kalckreuth took over the upper command here. The Bride United Corps marched left; General Eben and Colonel Schreiber command the Avant Guard. The headquarters was the night in Münzrnberg.  On the 27th Kalckreuth took the same to Assenheim on the left bank of the Nidda; the avant-guard stood at Zlberstadt, Kichen and neighborhood. - The Lieutenant v. Liweneck of the Ebrn'schrn Hussars, leader of the 15 Hussars strong tip of a detachment under the Major v. Hompesch, which consisted of only forty horses, and which had the purpose of patrolling the region to Homburg, attacked 50 chasseurs on horseback at Niederrossbach, chased them away and brought in 8 prisoners.

On the further advance, the 28th, the Avant Guard found Vilbel and Bergen occupied by the enemy; but the former village was so quickly abandoned that the Hussars of Eben could do nothing to them, as the terrain favored the enemy on their return to Frankfurt; but in Bergen Colonel Schreiber made the enemy detachment standing there, which was not cut down by it, into prisoners. There were 60 infantrymen and some cavalrymen. The cavalry burst from it, and the infantry immediately cleared the gates, but withdrew from the stone town hall, which took our light infantry battalion with the bayonet.

The French had 12 dead in the town hall, in which our most bitter soldiers gave no mercy in penetrating it, and only the humanity of the officers caused that not all the crew in it jumped over the sword. Schreiber had several dead and wounded, including his adjutant, Lieutenant v. Starkloff. The death of this good officer who leads to good hope. He was universally lamented, and still more so was his bride, who lived in Bergen, with whom he had betrothed himself before the opening of the campaign, and in whose arms he died. Only to see her a few moments earlier, and the desire to appear as a hero in her eyes, was the cause that he burst into the city without special cause, and was hit by an enemy bullet. The storming men saw him fall, and the feeling of revenge had increased their exasperation against the French in the town hall by a great deal.

Kalckreuth took position for this day at the height of mountains, his avant-guard until after the Friedberger waiting and the road leading to Bockenheim vorschaend. During the night, however, troops brigadenwrise occupied the villages in the line from Vilbel on the Nidda to Seckbach on the right bank of the Main, while the light troops under Eben and Schreiber occupied the villages of Eschersheim, Eckenheim and Ginheim, as well as the terrain in between also Znfanterirposten (of each brigade 150 man) were put up. In this position Kalckreuth ordered General van Helden to surrender Frankfurt. The then dispatched Prussian Colonel Lieutenant v. Pellet, however, did not return until the night, with the boastful reply from Captain himself-that he would deliver the keys of the city to the morning.

On the 29th we again got up, as we did the day before, at the height of Bergen; However, according to General Lieutenant v.Biesenrodt's statement, Kalckreuth states: "That he first awaits an order from the Landgrave, or whether he will stand still for the maintenance of armed neutrality on the border of the country which is at present freed from the enemy Part of the war was to be "separated" from the latter at 9 o'clock in the morning, and united with the Duke's army at Homburg, the Nidda bet Vilbel, where the landgrave of Hesse-Darmstadt with 3099 men (7 battalions of infantry and 3 squadron cavalry) united with him.

The above explanation of General Biesenrodt gives the proof that our prince at that time was certainly talking about whether it was not advisable, under the existing circumstances, and after what had been learned in the short campaign, to be at peace by assuming that he would not have given such an explanation without instruction. Only the right consequence of the landgrave led to the opposite, since, after joining a few months earlier, he conquered Paris and Louis XVI. Again to see the throne unrestricted, this was the decision that was consistent with the well-known solid character of this German prince.

No one in the army also doubted that Hesse would take any further part in a war which, according to Custine's conduct, was conducted for the happiness and tranquility of nations; the Landgrave's decision was all the more justified, since, in his action from Landau to Frankfurt, Custine had nowhere respected the neutrality of the German Reich, which was not yet at war with France, and thus also against the Landgrave of Hesse. Cassel would have acted as soon as the war's fortune declared himself favorable to him.*)

*) Only on 17 May 1793 was the war declared by the German Reich against France.

On the 30th, the Army Corps, which both on this day and on the previous day-the night again, as in the hours of Bergen-was in a crowded position, that we remain loyal allies of Prussia, as well as victory and glory which would give them a general rejoicing among the troops, to which all the soldiers took the most lively and fieriest part.  As the warlike mood increased it was that everyone recalled hearing from his father or grandfather that we were on the same ground where, some thirty years earlier, the Hessians were under Duke Ferdinand and Prince Isenburg - the latter the Fuhrer their grenadiers, though without the success which their bravura deserved, but with the greatest honor, would have defeated the superior enemy who was presently facing them again.  In addition, on both days at various times, Frankfurt citizens came to our position, telling the soldiers who had ranged the rifles and had parted ways: how did they see Custine and the Frenchmen (expressing themselves so) because they declared that they did not want to make common cause with them, as the Mainzians did, and that they themselves had propagated proclamations in the Hessian country in order to incite the infidels against their prince and against their superiors authorities, what to them already in the night quarters of their angry hosts had been told.

Several of these citizens, accompanied by officers and soldiers, were led in droves to the commandant, who spoke with those in the presence of the soldiers, who formed a wide circle around him. Cedar of these, not interpreting the words, endeavored to guess from his eyes, as well as from his movements, that he, too, was inspired by the thought of leading us towards the city, their faithful inhabitants of them so hated Frenchmen to free what wish expressed themselves in all the visors of those around him so that it needed no words. - Verily! it was a glorious, truly inspiring moment that I never saw as a soldier again. The heights of mountains have become unforgettable to me.

These were also important for us, because two years earlier here 6,000 Hessians had been in the camp under Leopold H.'s own leadership under the direction of the landgrave, and had been maneuvered before the first, which is also strange for German history because of that happened at the last German imperial coronation.

For me, the young officer, it was very instructive that several of my senior superiors had the great goodness to acquaint me with the details of the meeting in the area, in which the Hessian grenadiers under their then leader, the Prince of Isenburg, excelled who stayed here, had distinguished himself so well; among which was my battalion commander, Colonel Lieutenant Carl von Eschwege, who was shot through his neck at the election evening on the evening of the battle by the house-owner of his last quarters (a countryman) among the dead, but by this still living in him, carried home, and saved in this way.

The 1st of December was a rest day for the army, as both the Prussians and we remained quiet in our quarters. The day before, when Biesenrodt was ordered to work together again with the Prussians, the villages of Bornheim and Berkersheim had already been visited by us. The King of Prussia with the Duke of Draunschweig rode the outpost line as far as the Main; The enemy, too, used a small detachment of troops for a reconnaissance, which advanced in the area of Bonames, where Kalckreuth stood, but at once returned when she found the Prussians ready to receive her. Custine was thereby convinced that they were not thinking of an offensive move against him, and therefore retained Frankfort, although the day before, leaving his headquarters at Hoechst, he had declared to the magistrates united in a sitting that he, as soon as the Allies approached the city with seriousness, they would leave.

Toward the evening of the same day Biersenrodt was finally ordered by the duke to take Frankfurt the other day, and a general disposition determined what the army had to do to cover this undertaking.

After this Kalckreuth presented himself with the infamy brigades v. Vittinghof (Prussia) and v. Cohenhausrn (Hesse) as well as with the Prussian Hussars Regiment v. Eben and the Hessian Leib-Dragoons-Regiment, at the Brrtramshofe, to form the reserve of the troops attacking the city. The Duke's army took position behind the Friedberger Warte, left wing. At the same time, the Prince-Prince of Hohenlohe was ordered to avoid the hostile encroachments behind Oberursel; but the Duke of Weimar was to make a demonstration on the front of the enemy. All field guards, such as the crews of Homburg and Vilbel, stopped.  At the Hessian headquarters, the Army Corps received the following order of the day:

Disposition. For the attack of Frankfurt the 2nd of December will be formed with 3 columns at daybreak.  3rd column on the left bank of the Main, Colonel v. Stein: Comes from Hanau over Offenbach, unites with Rumpenheim with the Hessen-darmstadt'sche chevauxlegers regiment and exists:

1)   from this regiment;

2)   “     1st Battalion v. Kospoth;

3)   “     2nd   Battalion v. Kospoth

 He stops Offenbach and advances against the attack of this column on the side of Sachsenhausen; she storms the monkey and seeks to support the attacks on this earth. 150 men of the 2nd Battalion v. Kospoth, on the other hand, cross the river in covered ships, land at the butcher's gate in the middle of the city, and try to open another gate.

2nd column, General-Major v. Hanstein:

1) 1 officer and 20 hussars;

2) Light infantry battalion, to the right;

3) Grenadier Battalion von Eschwege, with sections left;

4) Wagons with bridge equipment;

5) 2nd Battalion Guard, with sections right;

6) 1st Battalion Body Regiment, from the middle with right and left;

7) 2nd Battalion Body Regiment, with sections on the right;

8) The Hussars Regiment;

9) Detachment von Kleist, broken off right.

The collecting station of this column is here Bornheim, on the way of Seckbach, and their direction the Allerheiligenthor.

1st Column, General-Major v. Wurmb:

1) 1 officer (Körnet von Osterhausen) with 20 horses, of the Guard du Corps;

2) 1 Captain (von Stein) with 40 horses of the Carabineer Regiment;

3) Detachment of 40-man Jäger (Capitain von Schmidt*);

4) The Jäger Corps, with right;

5) Grenadier, Battalion Philippsthal, with sections left;

6) Wagon with bridge equipment;

7) 1st Battalion Guard Grenadiers, with sections on the right;

8) 2nd Battalion Guard Grenadiers, from the center with right and left;

9) 1st Battalion Guard, in sections right;

10) Prussian battery six-pounder;

11) Squadron of  Guard du Corps, and

12) Carabineer Regiment, - stopped with fours.

*) Was last colonel and commander of Kurhessischen Land Gendarmerie and is dermal pensionnair. In an attack of the Carlsberg and the city of Homburg in the two bridges, where Colonel Schreiber commanded on April 16, 1793, a detachment of 1,500 Prussians and Hessians from the corps of the Crimean Prince of Hohenlohe, representing Corps in a position extended to Landstuhl the then Jäger Captain von Schmidt with 36 Prussian fusiliers and 50 Hessian Jäger the city of Homburg so well and with so successful a success that the King of Prussia, who hurried there, gave him the order pour merit on the same day. He is currently a Jubilee of this Order and wears the decorations that have been changed for this by the present King.

The concealed collection point of the 1st Column is on the Frankfurter Straße at the Friedberger Warte; she takes her direction to the New Thor.

At 7 o'clock in the morning all the columns are at their designated assembly stations.

It was also stipulated that the cavalry on the columns of the columns and the light troops should chase away the enemy, who would like to show himself outside the city, the artillery would shoot down the drawbridges, the infantry would pass them by means of gangways, and the light troops would Attack by a well-targeted rifle and gunman should support; The attacking battalions, too, were determined by the roads, the gates, and the squares which they had to occupy after entering the city.

Neues militairisches Magazin historischen und scientifischen Inhalts mit Plans und Karten

Neues militairisches Magazin historischen und scientifischen Inhalts mit Plans und Karten

(Issues from 1798-1806)

Neues militairisches Magazin historischen und scientifischen Inhalts mit Plänen und Karten (issues spanning 1798–1806) is a German-language military periodical that publishes analytical essays, historical studies, and technical discussions of warfare, supported by maps and operational diagrams. It belongs to the transitional intellectual world between late Enlightenment military science and early 19th-century professional military historiography.

The journal is not limited to a single conflict, but its content reflects the broader European military experience shaped by the Revolutionary and Napoleonic era. It includes discussions of strategy, tactics, fortifications, and campaign analysis drawn from both contemporary wars and earlier 18th-century conflicts, including material indirectly relevant to the American Revolutionary War through comparative military study.

A recurring focus of the publication is the professionalization of military knowledge in German states, including analysis of army organization, drill systems, and operational planning. Within this framework, forces from states such as the Electorate of Hesse appear in discussions of German military structure, recruitment systems, and coalition warfare practices, particularly as historical case studies of disciplined standing armies used in foreign service.

The magazine typically combines narrative accounts of campaigns with technical illustrations—plans of fortifications, battlefield maps, and diagrams of troop movements. This reflects its dual purpose: to preserve historical military knowledge and to serve as a professional reference for officers and military scholars.

Content from the period often engages with the rapid changes in warfare introduced by the French Revolutionary armies, contrasting older linear tactics with evolving operational concepts such as mass conscription, column attacks, and more fluid battlefield formations.

As a whole, the Neues militairisches Magazin represents an important source for understanding how late 18th- and early 19th-century German-speaking military thinkers analyzed both contemporary conflicts and earlier wars through a scientific and historical lens.

Kriegsbegebenheiten in Deutschland und ausführliche Beschreibung der Operationen der Preussen und Hessen nach ihrem Rückzuge aus Frankreich

Kriegsbegebenheiten in Deutschland und ausführliche Beschreibung der Operationen der Preussen und Hessen nach ihrem Rückzuge aus Frankreich

“Kriegsbegebenheiten in Deutschland und ausführliche Beschreibung der Operationen der Preussen und Hessen nach ihrem Rückzuge aus Frankreich…” (1792, “von einem Augenzeugen”) is a contemporary military account describing coalition operations on the Rhine frontier during the opening phase of the French Revolutionary Wars. It focuses on the aftermath of the initial Allied advance into France and the subsequent withdrawal and regrouping of Prussian and associated German forces.

The narrative details the reorganization of Allied troops along the Middle Rhine, with emphasis on the defense and stabilization of key positions such as Koblenz and the surrounding corridor. It describes operational efforts to contain and repel French Revolutionary forces that had begun to exert pressure on the right bank of the Rhine, as well as the temporary loss and later recovery of Frankfurt am Main as a strategically significant urban and logistical center.

The account reflects the structure of coalition warfare in the Holy Roman Empire, where Prussian forces operated alongside contingents drawn from various German states. Units from the Electorate of Hesse are incorporated into the operational narrative as part of the wider German contribution to allied defensive operations. Their functions are described in terms of field deployment, garrison duties, and participation in coordinated maneuvers along contested sectors of the Rhine.

Attention is given to the operational difficulties faced by coalition forces following the collapse of the initial invasion of France in 1792, including disrupted supply lines, shifting command structures, and the need to rapidly adapt to French Revolutionary military pressure. The text emphasizes movement, positioning, and the restoration of defensive coherence along the frontier rather than extended battle description.

As an eyewitness account, it combines direct observation with structured reporting of military activity, preserving contemporary perspectives on the early transformation of European warfare under Revolutionary conditions.