This study is an Austrian General Staff archival article published in the official military historical series of the Austrian State Archives (Kriegsarchiv). It examines the operational planning (“Disposition”) of Karl Mack von Leiberich for the Coalition attack on the French camp at Famars during the War of the First Coalition.
The article focuses on the planning phase of the Battle of Famars (23 May 1793), when Austrian, British, and Hanoverian forces under Coalition command attacked French positions near Valenciennes. It analyzes Mack’s proposed operational scheme, including the arrangement of columns, intended points of attack, coordination between allied contingents, and the overall strategic goal of breaking the French defensive position.
A central theme of the study is the relationship between staff planning and battlefield execution. It compares Mack’s theoretical disposition with the actual course of the battle, where Coalition forces ultimately succeeded in forcing the French army to abandon its positions, contributing to the broader Allied advance in the Austrian Netherlands during 1793.
The article is based on original Austrian archival material, including staff documents and operational correspondence, and reflects the analytical style of late 19th-century Austro-Hungarian military historiography. It provides insight into early Coalition command structures and the evolving role of General Staff planning in 18th-century warfare.
